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I. INTRODUCTION
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. 1
Religion has been a divisive factor in the history of human civilization.
Belief in the supernatural has not only defined and characterized cultures and
societies, but has also been the catalyst for war. While many states profess to
have a national religion, the United States is unique in providing constitutional
protection to its citizens in the exercise of their beliefs. 2 Although the system of
ethics and mores in the United States can arguably be analogized to the Judeo-
Christian belief system, the government may not introduce any law that favors
one religion over another or religion over nonreligion. Because of this broad
prohibition, students and teachers alike may not audibly recite religious prayers
in public schools.3 Respect must be demonstrated to persons of all beliefs or
nonbelief. This respect, however, is currently threatened by various state
legislatures seeking to reintroduce school prayer into the public schools through
statutes authorizing moments of silence. This Case Comment examines the
constitutionality of such statutes, concluding that indeed "moments of silence"
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Part II focuses on the
history of the Establishment Clause and the development of the proper test for
determining violations. Part II centers upon the specific case of Bown v.
Gwinnett County School District4 and Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in
Schools Act which mandates a period of silence in the public schools. And
finally, Part IV evaluates moment of silence laws under the three-prong Lemon
test, concluding that these statutes are inherently unconstitutional.
I James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 1
(1785) [hereinafter Memorial and Remonstrance] in SAUL K. PADOVER, THE COMPLErE
MADISON 299-300 (1953).
2 The relevant portion of the First Amendment states the following: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,424-25 (1962).
4 895 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
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II. THE COURTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
[E]xperience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of
maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.
During almost fifteen centuries, has the legal establishment of Christianity been
on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and
indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in both,
superstition, bigotry and persecution.
5
The cogent alliance between Christianity and the United States government
is interwoven together as thread in the larger tapestry of American society.
Whether it be in the words of the Pledge of Allegiance, 6 the inscriptions on
American currency, 7 or the National Day of Prayer,8 the Judeo-Christian God
continues to find its place within American culture.
Any analysis of the Establishment Clause must begin with an inquiry into
the three main schools of thought that influenced the drafters of the First
Amendment: (1) the Evangelical View, (2) the Jeffersonian View, and (3) the
Madisonian View.9 The Evangelical influence viewed the separation of church
and state as a means of protecting the church. The church feared the influence
of "worldly corruptions" and saw the absence of the state in church affairs as
imposing a climate on society that was conducive to the conduct of all
religions. 10 Thus, the Evangelical View was one of positive toleration.
The Jeffersonian school of thought, on the other hand, was just the
opposite of that of the evangelics. Jefferson viewed the separation of church
and state as a means of safeguarding the secular interests of society against
5 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1, 7.
6 See 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1994) (In a 1954 amendment to the Pledge of Allegiance, the
words "under God" were added to read "one nation under God.").
7 The government requires that each coin minted contain the inscription "In God We
Trust." 31 U.S.C. § 5112 (d)(1)(1994). See O'Hair v. Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19, 19-20
(W.D. Tex. 1978), affid sub nom., O'Hair v. Murray, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that the national motto and its inscription on coins do not violate the Establishment
Clause or Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because its use is of a patriotic
character); see also Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243-44 (9th Cir. 1970)
(holding that the national motto has no theological or ritualistic impact).
8 See 36 U.S.C. § 169h (1994) (establishing the first Thursday of May in each year as
a "National Day of Prayer, on which the people of the United States may turn to God in
Prayer and Meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals").
9 See LAURENCE H. TRiNE, AMmcAN CONSTrrtrONAL LAw § 14-3, at 1158-59 (2d
ed. 1988).
10 See id.
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"ecclesiastical deprecations and incursions."'" Religion must be divorced from
the state because only then could free choice among political views occur.12
And finally, the Madisonian view was a compromise of the two
aforementioned ideals. Madison believed that both religious and secular
interests were able to thrive best when each was permitted to act freely within
its own sphere. 13 These interests would be best protected "by an entire
abstinance [sic] of the Government from interference in any way whatever,
beyond the necessity of preserving public order, [and] protecting each sect
against trespass on its legal rights by others." 14 Determination of the actual
intent of the Framers remains as an ongoing debate within the High Court to
this date. The various Justices continue to point to the Framers' intent as a key
in determining violations of the Establishment Clause. Unfortunately, the
Justices cannot agree.
The first modem case to reach the Court concerning the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment 5 involved a local New Jersey school district
authorization that reimbursed, parents of parochial school children the cost of
transporting their child to school via the public bus transportation system. 16 In
ultimately deciding that there was no violation of the Establishment Clause, the
Court laid the foundation for later Establishment Clause interpretation.
The Everson Court reasoned that the Establishment Clause was the result
of three elements, namely the background of the period in which the religion
clauses were scribed, the conglomeration of the Madisonian and Jeffersonian
views, and the conjecture that in the absence of a church-state separation,
persecution and civil strife would reign. 17 The Court noted that many early
settlers emigrated from Europe to escape the religious persecution and tax
burdens of state churches in their respective homelands. 18 The early colonies,
however, began mimicking the actions of the old world by installing state
churches, by forcing all persons who lived in the community to pay taxes to the
church, and by persecuting those who practiced different beliefs. 19 The
11 Id. at 1159.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting JAMES MADISON, IX, THE WRiTINGS OF JAMES
MADISON (C. Hunted., 1910)).
15 The First Amendment was first incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
16 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1947).
17 See TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-3 at 1160.
18 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-9.
19 See id. "The very charters granted by the English Crown to the individuals and
companies designated to make the laws which would control the destinies of the colonials
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resentment which arose amongst the colonists from this religious oppression
found "expression" in the First Amendment. 20 In his Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, Madison argued that true
religion did not need the support of human law, the interest of society was best
served when the minds of humans were wholly free, and government-
established religions inevitably resulted in persecution. 21 Thus the early
Americans desired a government deprived of all power to tax, support, assist,
or interfere with any religion (or lack of religion) or belief held by individuals
or groups. 22
From this examination of history, the Everson Court formulated a broad
prohibition through the Establishment Clause of government interference with
religion:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was indeed to erect "a wall of separation
between Church and State."23
This prohibition is the basis of the standard used for determining violations
of the religion clauses. Despite this comprehensive language, the Court upheld
authorized these individuals and companies to erect religious establishments... ." Id. at 9.
In Massachusetts in the winter of 1774, the state church had imprisoned fourteen Baptists
because of their refusal to pay taxes to the Congregationalist minister. In Virginia, in 1771,
four Baptist ministers were imprisoned for holding a religious service "under the pretense of
the exercise of Religion in other manner than according to the Liturgy and Practice of the
Church of England." Additionally, by 1790, most states authorized the taxation of all for
the support of religion, although individuals could give to the church of their own choice.
See LEoNARDW. LEVY, THE ESTABLISn.ENT CLAUSE 2, 3, 10 (1994).
20 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
21 See id. at 12 (citing JAMES MADISON, II WRrriNGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (Galliard
Hunted., 1910)).22 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 11.
23 Id. at 15-16.
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the validity of the New Jersey statute. 24
The Court concentrated on two factors in attempting to reconcile the
prohibition with its holding. First, the Court likened the reimbursement of
parents for their child's transportation cost to public governmental services
offered by the state for the benefit of all citizens and organizations, including
religious institutions.25 Parents might be reluctant to send their child to
parochial school26 if the government did not provide services such as police
and fire protection, sewage disposal, sidewalks, and public highways. In the
same way, parents might be reluctant to send their child to a religious school if
required to pay the child's bus fare out of pocket, when the state incurs the cost
of transportation for public school children. 27 Inevitably, if the government
discontinued these services, the schools would have a difficult time operating.
The First Amendment was not intended to create obstacles for religious
institutions. 28
Second, the Court determined that the New Jersey statute was
constitutional because, quite simply, the reimbursement policy was applicable
regardless of religious affiliation. 29 The Court had previously stated that
parents may send their children to religious schools, as long as those schools
complied with state compulsory education laws. 30 The New Jersey statute did
nothing more than ensure a safe, reliable means of transportation for all
students, regardless of religion.
Hence, the importance of Everson is not so much its ultimate validation of
the New Jersey statute, but rather its broad prohibition of the commingling of
church and state and its examination of history in determining the breadth and
purpose of the Establishment Clause. 31
24 See id. at 17.
25 See id. at 17-18.
26 This Case Comment uses the terms "parochial school" and "nonpublic school"
interchangeably. The essence of the idea is that these are privately operated institutions. It
just so happens that most nonpublic schools are privately run by religious organizations.
27 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
28 "That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary." Id.
at 18.
29 See id.
30 See id. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924)).
31 Everson, however, did not avoid the criticisms of the dissent and later scholars.
Justice Jackson, dissenting, stated that the "undertones of the opinion, advocating complete
and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its
conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educational matters." Id. at 19
(Jackson, J., dissenting). Additionally, he reasoned that the majority's basic flacy was its
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The first Supreme Court opinion to invalidate a statute as a violation of the
Establishment Clause involved a noneconomic benefit to religion: time release
programs. 32 Under a Champaign County, Illinois school district policy,
religious clergy employed by private religious organizations taught religious
studies to interested students once a week in the public schools. The school
board authorized the teachers to release students from their secular studies in
order to attend these religious meetings. Those students desiring not to take
part in the religious affair were sent to other parts of the school in order to
pursue secular activities. 33 The parent of a child in the Champaign public
schools challenged the policy on the ground that it violated the Establishment
Clause. The state supreme court affirmed the constitutionality of the time
release program. The United States Supreme Court reversed.
In concluding that the time release program did indeed violate the
Establishment Clause, the majority heavily relied upon the broad prohibition
established by the Everson Court.34 The Court reasoned that allowing pupils to
disregard their secular studies during school hours in order to pursue religious
teachings by private clergy constituted state assistance in aiding religious
groups to spread their beliefs.35 The Constitution required complete separation
from religion, not neutral governmental assistance to all religions. 36 The
requirement of the First and Fourteenth Amendments-that states not use the
public schools in fostering religion among students-did not suggest a
total disregard of the "essentially religious test by which beneficiaries of this expenditure are
selected." Id. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Like Justice Jackson, Justice Rutledge, in his
dissenting opinion, opposed any degree of relation between the civil state and religion. The
purpose of the Establishment Clause was "to create a complete and permanent separation of
the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every
form of public aid or support for religion." Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See also
Robert A. Holland, Comment, A Theory of Establishment Clause Adjudi'cation:
Individualism, Social Contract, and the Significance of Coercion in Iden'fying Threats to
Religious Liberty, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1595, 1602-04 (1992).
32 See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
33 See id. at 205, 209.
34 See id. at 210-11 (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)).
35 "This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls squarely under
the ban of the First Amendment ... ." Id. at 210.
36 See id. at 210 n.6 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 59, 60 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
"Legislatures are free to make, and courts to sustain, appropriations only when it can be
found that in fact they do not aid, promote, encourage or sustain religious teaching or
observances, be the amount large or small." Id. at 210 n.7 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 52-
53).
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governmental opposition to religion.37 On the contrary, the history of the
Establishment Clause intimates that "both religion and government can best
work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its
respective sphere." 38 It is vital that a wall between the church and state "be
kept high and impregnable." 39
Because of the history of the First Amendment, the precedent set by the
Everson Court, and the fact that public facilities were used during school hours
for nonsecular means, the Justices concluded that the state was impermissibly
aiding religion. The Court, therefore, in an eight to one decision,40 invalidated
the time release program as a violation of the Establishment Clause.41
In 1962, the Supreme Court declared the unconstitutionality of state
sponsored school prayer. 42 At issue in Engel was the validity of a New York
statute mandating the daily recitation of a short religious prayer at the
commencement of class in the public schools. 43 The parents of ten children in
New York public schools alleged that a violation of the Establishnent Clause
occurred because the state legislature of New York had composed the prayer. 44
37 See id. at 211.
38 Id. at 212.
39 Id.
40 Justice Reed was the lone dissenting judge. In his argument, Reed looked to the
presence and tradition of religion in the American society and concluded that the American
people accepted this as part of its culture and tradition and nothing more. See id. at 239
(Reed, I., dissenting).
41 But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (affirming the constitutionality of a
time release program because students left school grounds to attend the religious activities);
see also Holland, supra note 31, at 1618-19.
42 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962). Prior to Engel, in 1961, the
Court upheld the validity of a Maryland statute advocating the closure of labor, business and
commercial activity on Sundays. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The
Court analogized "Sunday closing laws" to societal ethics and morals such as the illegality
of murder. Although Sunday closing laws, like murder, may provide some benefit to the
church-Sunday closing laws allow church attendance, while the illegality of murder is
consistent with the Ten Commandments-the Establishment Clause did "not ban federal or
state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize
with the tenets of some or all religions." Id. at 442. The Court cited secular reasons-health
and safety of workers, uniform day of rest, repose, recreation and tranquillity for all
citizens, and a day to strengthen family ties-for the existence of the Sunday closing laws.
See id. at 434-35, 445, 450, 451.
43 The words of the prayer were as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and
our Country." Id. at 422.
44 See id. at 425.
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The New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The
United States Supreme Court reversed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Black flatly declared that the government
should in no way involve itself in the business of creating prayers. 45 In
concluding that the purpose of the recitation of the prayer was purely religious,
Black concentrated on the lessons taught by history concerning the treading of a
national government upon religious affairs. Invariably, government intrusions
into religion have brought about conflict, persecution, mistrust of government,
and loss of respect for religion.46 As one regime placed its stamp of approval
upon one belief system, minorities clamored for change and attempted to
influence state leaders to change with the next regime.47 As a result of this
constant conflict, a mistrust of government arose as each regime persecuted the
religious minority in an effort to remain in power.48 Additionally, others lost
respect for any religion once held in favor with the state. 49 Hence
the First Amendment was added to the Constitution to stand as a guarantee that
neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to
control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can
say-that the people's religions must not be subjected to the pressures of
government .... 50
The Court found that through the daily recitation of the prayer, the New
York legislature used the prestige of the government to "influence the kinds of
prayer the American people [could] say."51 The prayer established the religious
beliefs embodied within. 52 The legislature had created an "indirect coercive
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially
approved religion." 53 For these reasons, the prayer violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.
The principle of governmental neutrality in the realm of religion was the
driving force behind the decision of the Court to invalidate Pennsylvania and
Maryland statutes requiring a daily reading of the Bible over the public address
45 See id. at 433.
46 See id. at 425-26, 431.47 See id. at 426-27.
48 See id. at 432.
49 See id. at 431.
50 Id. at 429-30.
51 Id. at 429.
52 See id. at 430.53 Id. at 43 1.
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system.5 4 The school districts argued that the reading was not of a religious
intent but rather possessed the secular purposes of promoting moral values,
contradicting the materialistic trend of American society, perpetuating
educational institutions, and teaching literature. 55 Those students not wishing to
take part in the reading were excused with parental permission. In affirming the
decision of the district court, the United States Supreme Court discounted these
secular intents and held the statutes violative of the Establishment Clause.
The Court considered both the purpose and the effect of the statute, for a
primary effect of a statute must not be one that advances or inhibits religion.56
By reviewing previous cases challenging the Establishment Clause, the Court
noted the overall theme of governmental neutrality, the necessity of which
evolved through history. The state pierced this wall of neutrality by allowing
essentially religious services to occur each morning with the recitation of
passages from the Bible, followed by the Lord's Prayer.57 The religious end
result overshadowed the purported secular purposes for the readings. The Bible
is part of religion. While the study of the Bible in public schools is permissible
for its literary or historical value,58 its use at the beginning of the school day
lacks any such value.59 Indeed, no discussion occurred following the reading.
Additionally, the allowance of student exclusion from the readings was of
little support to the state. This exclusion, in fact, indicated a recognition by the
state of the religious nature of the Bible verses. 60 Moreover, historically, the
majority has never been allowed to require religious exercises which violate
minority beliefs by simply creating state laws excusing the minorities from the
majority practice.61 This action is inconsistent with the purpose and breadth of
the Bill of Rights.
Hence, the Schempp Court disallowed a breach of the wall of neutrality
54 See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1963).
55 See id. at 223-24.
56 See id. at 222. This two-part analysis later served as the basis for the first two
prongs of the Lemon test. See infra note 64 and text accompanying note 65.
57 See id. at 223.
58 See id. at 225.
59 See id. at 224.
60 See id.
61 The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right
to... freedom of worship ... and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
Id. at 226 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
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separating the church and the state. By analyzing the purpose and effect of the
statutes, the majority found that the wall must stand firm, no matter the size of
encroachment. 62
The cumulative effect of the preceding cases formed the basis for the three-
prong Establishment Clause test expounded by the Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.63 The Lemon test is three-fold: (1) the challenged statute must have
a secular, legislative purpose; (2) the primary effect of the statute must neither
advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) the statute must not cultivate an excessive
government entanglement with religion. 64 At issue in Lemon were two state
62 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 ("ilt is no defense to urge that the religious practices
here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The breach of
neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent .. ").
63 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Prior to Lemon, two Establishment Clause cases
which reached the Court deserve at least a moment's regard. In Board of Education v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the Court upheld a New York statute permitting public school
districts to purchase textbooks with public funds and lend them to all students (including
parochial school students) in the public school district. See id. at 239. By analogizing the
book-loaning statute in Allen to the transportation statute at issue in Everson, the Court was
able to reiterate its broad prohibition of intermingling of church and state, yet deem the
statute constitutional because the primary effect of the statute was not the advancement of
religion. See id. at 243. The important aspect of this case is the adoption by the Court of the
stated Establishment Clause test set forth in Shempp: "'[What are the purpose and the
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then
the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution.'" Id. (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
In the second case, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of a tax exemption for
religious organizations on property used exclusively for religious exercises. See Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 666-67 & n.1 (1970). The importance of Walz is the
evaluation of the statute beyond its intent and effect. The Court reasoned that there must not
be excessive government entanglement with religion in the statute. See id. at 674. The test,
the Court continued, was one of degree, determining "whether the [state] involvement [with
religion] is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing
surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement." Id. at 675. The Court
determined that direct money subsidies to religious organizations contained more elements
of entanglement than an indirect benefit, namely tax exemptions, due to the necessary
enforcement of statutory and administrative standards. See id. Hence, the Court held tax
exemptions as constitutional. This analysis of government entaglement formed the third part
of the Lemon test. See infra text accompanying note 65.
6 4 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The three-prong Lemon test has repeatedly been
criticized by later courts and scholars. Some argue that the test "restricts religious
participation in the political process without adequate justification." Hal Cubertson, Religion
in the Political Process: A Critique of Lemon's Purpose Test, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 915,
916 (1990). Others criticize the test as a threat to religious liberty. See Holland, supra note
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statutes concerning state reimbursement to nonpublic schools. The first was a
Rhode Island statute allowing state officials to supplement the salary of a
teacher who instructs secular courses in a nonpublic school. The second was a
Pennsylvania statute authorizing direct reimbursement by the state to the
nonpublic schools for expenses associated with salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials for courses in secular subjects.65 In both situations, the
legislatures found that the authorization of these reimbursements best served the
educational needs of each respective state. The Supreme Court held both of
these statutes in violation of the Establishment Clause.
After quickly accepting the stated legislative purposes of each statute, thus
satisfying the first prong of the Lemon test, the Court determined that these
statutes fostered excessive government entanglement with religion. "In order to
determine whether the government entanglement with religion is excessive, we
must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited,
the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority." 66 The Court reasoned
that the tight relationship between the parochial schools and the Catholic
Church would require too much surveillance to assure that religious ideals were
not furthered by the use of the state reimbursement money. 67 Relying on the
district court findings in the Rhode Island case, the Court noted that the church
schools involved in the program were physically close to the parish churches,
the buildings contained religious symbols, the majority of teachers were nuns,
the atmosphere of the school was quite religious, and the potential for teachers
to instruct their religious ideals, even through secular subjects, was great.68
Although course instructors may not purposely inject religious ideals into their
secular subjects, the potential to do so was great because the financial control
of the schools was largely at the discretion of each individual parish, nuns were
principals in all but two of the schools, and a Handbook of School Regulations,
"which had the force of synodal law in the diocese," governed all the
schools. 69 The Court reasoned that the parochial schools might actually be able
to separate the religious and secular teachings, but this separation would
31, at 1653-58.
65 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607, 609.
66 Id. at 615.
67 See id. at 619-21.
68 See id. at 615, 617.
69 Id. at 617-18.
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require excessive surveillance. 70 This surveillance was an impermissible
governmental entanglement.7'
Additionally, the Court considered the potential political divisiveness of the
statutes. As costs of parochial education would rise, proponents of the
reimbursement policy would advocate their cause and encourage political
action. In the same respect, opponents of the policy would likely counter this
argument by championing political action against the statutes. "It would be
unrealistic to ignore the fact that many people confronted with issues of this
kind will find their votes aligned with their faith." 72 The First Amendment was
enacted, in part, to end political division along religious lines, for this threatens
the very political process. 73 This conflict would cause individuals to
concentrate on religious ideals in political arenas, and disregard other necessary
issues at every political level, thereby causing excessive entanglement between
the state and religion. 74
Because of the excessive government entanglement between the state and
religion resulting from the need for surveillance of the parochial schools to
ensure no intrusion of religious ideals into secular subjects, and because of the
potential political divisiveness of the statutes causing individuals to align
themselves along religious lines, the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
reimbursement policies were held unconstitutional. 75
In the first and only case to reach the Supreme Court concerning "moments
of silence" in public schools, the Court held in a six to three decision that the
Alabama statute authorizing a moment of silence for meditation or voluntary
prayer endorsed religion, lacked a secular purpose, and therefore violated the
Establishment Clause.76 The plaintiff alleged that the statute authorized the
70 See id. at 619-21 ("A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the
First Amendment otherwise respected.... These prophylactic contacts will involve
excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church.").
71 See id. at 620.
72 Id. at 622.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 623.
75 The Court, until recently, used the Lemon test in every Establishment Clause
challenge, save one. That one was Marsh v. Chwnbers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), in which the
Court relied upon the "deeply embedded" history and tradition in the United States of
legislature prayer to uphold the validity of a Nebraska statute authorizing prayer at the
opening of the state legislature by a chaplain paid with public funds. See id. at 795.
76 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-59 (1985). Several lower courts have
considered moments of silence in the public schools. See May v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240
(3d Cir. 1985); Walter v. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. (S.D. W. Va. 1985);
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maintenance of religious exercises in the public schools, and this was contrary
to the First Amendment to the Constitution. The plaintiff further asserted that
his two minor children had been "indoctrinated from the beginning of the
school year" by the teacher who led the class in a daily prayer. Teachers and
students alike ostracized the children for not participating in the daily ritual. 77
The district court decided that the statute was constitutional, because the
Establishment Clause did not prohibit the state from establishing a religion.78
Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983); Beck v. McElrath, 548
F. Supp. 1161 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass.
1976); see also 440 N.E.2d 1159 (Mass. 1982) (advisory opinion of Supreme Court of
Massachusetts to the Massachusets House of Representatives); 307 A.2d 558 (N.H. 1973)
(advisory opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire to the New
Hampshire Senate); cf Marsa v. Wernik, 430 A.2d 888 (NJ. 1981) (challenging a moment
of silence at the commencement of city council meetings).
Prior to Jaffree, but subsequent to Lemon, the Court considered the Establishment
Clause numerous times. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (requiring public
universities to hold facilities available for religious and nonreligious student groups alike);
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding statute authorizing posting of Ten
Commandments in public classrooms violated the Establishment Clause); Wolnan v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1976) (validating statutes allowing public schools to loan books to
religious schools, state funded standardized testing of nonpublic school students, speech and
hearing diagnostic testing of nonpublic students by public employees, therapeutic services to
nonpublic students off of nonpublic school grounds; but invalidating statutes authorizing
state aid of teaching materials, such as maps, etc., to religious schools and state funding for
transportation for nonpublic school field trips); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (holding New York statute authorizing funding for
maintenance and repair of nonpublic schools as violative of the Establishment Clause).
One case of importance during this period held that the erection of a creche in a state
sponsored holiday display, although a symbol of religion, was not violative of the First
Amendment. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The importance of this
case is not so much in its holding, but rather in the introduction of the "endorsement test" as
the means of determining whether the challenged statute has a secular purpose:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of
government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question should render the
challenged practice invalid.
Id. at 690 (O'Connor, I., concurring). The majority of the Court embraced this view in
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56, and this view has subsequently become part of the analysis under
the purpose prong of the Lemon test.
7 7 See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 42.
7 8 See id. at 45.
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The court of appeals overruled the district court opinion, and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed.
After visiting the same history hashed out by earlier courts, the Court
applied the Lemon test to the Alabama statute, holding that an impermissible
religious purpose existed. 79 The Court first noted that the sponsor of the
legislation had inserted into the record without objection that this bill was an
effort to return prayer to the public schools.80 In the district court, the sponsor
further stated that this reintroduction of prayer was his intent when he
sponsored this legislation.81 Moreover, the state did not demonstrate any
evidence indicating a secular purpose for the statute.
Second, the Court reasoned that this religious purpose was substantiated by
examining the statute authorizing the period of meditation or voluntary prayer
with a previous statute mandating a period of silence for meditation only.8 2 The
only difference between the two statutes was the addition of the words "or
voluntary prayer." The Court thus reasoned that the only explanation for the
addition of the new statute was to place prayer back into the schools. This
reason was impermissible under the Establishment Clause for it indicated a
desire to "characterize prayer as a favored practice." 83
Because of the impermissible religious intent of the Alabama legislature, as
exhibited through the intent of the sponsor of the bill and the addition of the
words "or voluntary prayer," the Supreme Court deemed the Alabama moment
of silence statute unconstitutional.8 4
The last major case to reach the Supreme Court involving a direct
challenge to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment concerned the
offering of a nonsectarian prayer in the invocation and benediction of a high
school graduation.85 The school district argued that attendance at graduation
79 See id. at 66.
80 See id. at 56-57.
81 See id.
82 See id. at 58-59.
83 Id. at 60.
84 There is some indication by the Court, both in its concurring and dissenting
opinions, that moments of silence statutes making no mention of religion may be
constitutional. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
85 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). Following Jaffree and prior to
Weisman, the Court considered several Establishment Clause challenges. See Board of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (holding secondary schools must provide equal
access to facilities to religious and nonreligious student groups); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that display of a creche inside courthouse endorses a
state religion, but display of menorah outside of courthouse next to Christmas tree had no
effect of endorsing a state religion); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)
1412 [Vol. 57:1399
SILENCE BEGETS RELIGION
ceremonies was not required and that the importance and formal atmosphere of
the event merited a prayer.8 6 A high school student and parent, on the other
hand, argued that the graduation prayer forced them to conform to a religion
established by the state. The district court and appellate court both found the
statute violative of the First Amendment.8 7 The Supreme Court affirmed these
opinions.
The Court concentrated on two aspects in determining a violation: (1) the
principal of the school acted as an agent of the state, and (2) the effect of the
prayer on dissenters of prayer at the graduation was to indirectly coerce them
into a religious conformance established by the state.88 Concerning the first
aspect, the state was impermissibly involved with religion when the principal
decided to include an invocation and benediction in the graduation ceremonies,
chose the clergyman to give the address, and distributed to the clergy
guidelines in developing a nonsectarian prayer. 89 The action at fault was not
the good faith of the school district in offering the prayer, but the fact that the
public school took on the obligation at all. 90 Religion belonged in the private
sphere, not in the public domain. 91
Second, the effect of the state sponsored prayer in secondary school
commencement exercises was to subtly coerce those not wishing to take part to
conform to the religious ideals expressed in the prayer. The decisions of the
principal resulted in an indirect coercive effect on the students, providing no
alternative to a clearly religious action. 92 "What to most believers may seem
nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their
religious practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or
dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a
religious orthodoxy." 93 Students are compelled to stand during the recitation of
the prayer and may be injured by a perception of being "forced by the State to
pray in a manner [their] conscience will not allow. " 94 Because students do not
have the real option of not attending their graduation ceremony, although
technically, attendance is not mandatory, "the Constitution forbids the State to
(invalidating Louisiana statute prohibiting the instruction of the theory of evolution unless
accompanied by instruction in the Creation Theory).
86 See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 594-95.
87 See id. at 584, 585.
88 See id. at 587, 596.
89 See id. at 587-88.
90 See id at 588-89.
91 See id. at 588.92 See id.
93 Id. at 592.
94 Id. at 593.
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exact religious conformity for a student as the price of attending her own high
school graduation." 95
Hence, because of the state involvement, through the principal, in the
selection of clergy and preparation of the prayer at graduation ceremonies, and
because of the indirect coercive effect on students to conform to pray in a
manner which may be contrary to their consciences, the Supreme Court struck
this statute down.
The foregoing analysis of the prior decisions of the Supreme Court
concerning challenges to the Establishment Clause is crucial to the
understanding of the means of determining the constitutionality of moments of
silence in public schools, the issue proffered in Bown v. Gwinnett County
School District.96 Although the Court has continued to cite Thomas Jefferson,
arguing the necessity of a wall between the state and the church, the Supreme
Court has dissembled some of the bricks from its very foundation and tossed
them on the ground around the wall, leaving questions of wonder for
theologians and lay persons alike.
The opinions, while allowing many questions to linger as to the correct
determination of Establishment Clause violations, are nevertheless the
framework that lower courts have to erect their own walls. In Part IV, this
Case Comment argues that the reasoning of the Court to date suggests the
unconstitutionality of "moments of silence" in public schools. Through
adherence to precedent and the intent of the Framers, moments of silence in
schools cannot constitutionally exist within our free society.
III. BOWN V. GWVNETT COUN7Y ScHooL DISTRICT
Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe
the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal
freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has
convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not
against man: To God, therefore, not to men, must an account of it be
rendered.9
7
95 Id. at 596.
96 895 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
97 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1, 4.
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A. The Facts-A Champion of Rights or a Disobedient Citizen?
The Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act,98 in its entirety, states the
following:
(a) In each public school classroom, the teacher in charge shall, at the opening
of school upon every school day, conduct a brief period of quiet reflection for
not more than sixty seconds with the participation of all the pupils therein
assembled.
(b) The moment of quiet reflection authorized by subsection (a) of this Code
section is not intended to be and shall not be conducted as a religious service or
exercise but shall be considered as an opportunity. for a moment of silent
reflection on the anticipated activities of the day.
(c) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section shall not
prevent student initiated voluntary school prayers at schools or school related
events which are nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature.
On August 22, 1994, Brian Gillespie Bown, a teacher at South Gwinnett
High School defied this Act and continued to teach throughout the moment of
silence.99
During the prior summer, Bown had written to the superintendent of
Gwinnett County Schools stating his objections to the mandated period of
silence in the public schools. He was concerned about his liability in
implementing the silence, which, in his opinion, would be banning speech. 1 °
98 GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (Supp. 1995). This provision repealed the prior 1969
statute, which provided for voluntary school prayer:
(a). In each public school classroom, the teacher in charge may or, if so
authorized or directed by the board of education by which he is employed, shall,
at the opening of school upon every school day, conduct a brief period of silent
prayer or meditation with the participation of all the pupils therein assembled.
(b). The silent prayer or meditation authorized by subsection (a) of this section is
not intended to be, and shall not be conducted as, a religious service or exercise,
but shall be considered as an opportunity for silent prayer or meditation on a
religious theme by those who are so disposed, or a moment of silent reflection on
the anticipated activities of the day.
Silent Prayer or Meditation in Public School Classrooms, Act No. 324, 1969 Ga. Laws 488
(1969) (repealed 1994) (cited in Bown, 895 F. Supp. at 1566).
99 See Bown, 895 F. Supp. at 1565.
100 See id. at 1568-69 ("If I determine that my conscience will permit me to enforce
this law, what guidance can you give me on exceptions to the absolute ban on speech during
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In a later deposition, Bown testified that he was a "born again" Christian
whose religious beliefs coincided with the Unitarian Church. He believed that
the Act favored Christians, and thus violated his religious belief that all
religions deserve respect. 101
In response to Bown's letter, the school administration sent to Bown an
administrative bulletin prepared by the school system to answer questions
concerning the moment of quiet reflection. 102 Moreover, prior to the
commencement of classes for the school year, Bown met with the principal of
the school and stated his reluctance to implement the statute.' °3 The school
board, as a result of Bown's concerns, resolved that the principal of each
school would daily read a prepared announcement over the public address
system introducing the moment of reflection. 10 4
Hence, on the morning of the first day of classes, Ms. Hendrix, the
principal of South Gwinnett High School, read the following announcement,
thereby implementing the moment of reflection: "As we begin our day, let us
take a few moments to reflect quietly on our day, our activities and what we
hope to accomplish." 10 5 After a momentary pause, Bown continued his lesson
and stated, "You may do as you wish. That's your option. But I am going to
continue with my lesson." 1°6
the 'moment of quiet reflection?'").
101 See id. at 1569, n.4.
102 In part, the bulletin stated the following:
It is important that we recommend that teachers and administrators do not suggest or
imply that students should or should not use that time for prayer. If a student asks, a
teacher should advise a student that if the student desires to have a quiet prayer, he or
she may do so. The statute specifically says "moment of quiet reflection." This clearly
precludes students using the moment of quiet reflection to pray audibly, singly or in
unison. We should not allow or tolerate any coercion or overbearing by some students
to force others to pray. Nevertheless, we should be tolerant of non-disruptive,
nonsectarian, non-proselytizing, student initiated prayer so long as it does not occur
during the moment of quiet reflection; otherwise, it will not be a moment of quiet
reflection. This time is not intended to be and shall not be conducted as a religious
service or exercise, but considered as an opportunity for a moment of silent reflection
on the anticipated activities of the day.
Id. at 1569.
103 See id.
104 See id. ("[This procedure was selected to insure that the moment of silence is
handled the same way every day and to insure that the teachers are not required to make the
announcement or remember to do it.").
105 Id.
106 Id
.
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Following his statement, a few students in Bown's class placed Bibles on
their desks, while another bowed her head in prayer. Bown continued teaching
class.
In the afternoon of this same, eventful day, Brian Bown met with the
superintendent and the principal to discuss his early morning rebellious actions.
After understanding that the school system would take disciplinary actions if
Bown did not comply with the moment of reflection, Bown received
permission to ponder his future actions until the following day. The next
morning Bown refused to allow the moment of quiet reflection and was
promptly suspended with pay. 107
The following day, August 24, 1994, Bown filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. s08 In his complaint,
Bown sought a declaratory judgment that the Moment of Quiet Reflection in
Schools Act violated the Constitution and sought a permanent injunction against
its implementation. 109
On September 21 and 22, 1994, the school board of Gwinnett County
conducted a termination hearing of Bown. Bown appeared with his attorney at
the meeting, but presented no evidence. The Board unanimously voted to
terminate Bown's employment with the school district. 110
In the subsequent suit, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia upheld the constitutionality of the Moment of Quiet
Reflection in Schools Act.
B. The Reasoning-Silence and Nothing More?
The district court applied the three-prong Lemon test, and therefore this
Case Comment will address the holding of the court in three separate
sections."1 '
10 7 See id. at 1570.
108 See id. at 1565.
109 See id. at 1570.
110 See id.
111 As stated above, the United States Supreme Court has applied the Lemon test in the
majority of cases since the test was developed in 1971. See supra note 76 and
accompanying text. The Eleventh Circuit had ruled prior to Bown that the reasoning used in
Marsh was not applicable in the "'special context of the public elementary and secondary
school system,' [where] the Supreme court [sic] 'has been particularly vigilant in monitoring
compliance with the Establishment Clause.'" Bown, 895 F. Supp. at 1573 (alteration in
original) (quoting Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 828 (1lth Cir. 1989)).
The Supreme Court in Marsh had upheld prayer before the commencement of the Nebraska
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1. Secular Purpose
Based on the plain meaning of the statute and the legislative history of the
Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act, the court found a secular purpose.
First, the court reasoned that the specific language of the statute distinctly
demonstrated the secular intent of the statute. The preamble to the statute has
no mention of prayer:
The General Assembly finds that in today's hectic society, all too few citizens
are able to experience even a moment of quiet reflection before plunging
headlong into the day's activities. Our young citizens are particularly affected
by this absence of an opportunity for a moment of quiet reflection. The
General Assembly finds that our young, and society as a whole, would be well
served if students were afforded a moment of quiet reflection at the beginning
of each day in the public schools.1 12
According to the court, within the confines of this preamble, the Georgia
legislature had explicitly stated a secular purpose for the Act, namely that a
moment of reflection is beneficial to children. 113 Moreover, the Act itself, in
subsection (b) proposed a secular topic to contemplate during the brief moment
-the anticipated activities of the day. In fact, the same subsection expressly
stated that this was not intended to be a moment of religious service.114 Hence,
the actual language of the Act emits only secular encouragement, while
specifically prohibiting the use of the reflection time as a religious service.1 15
Second, the court reasoned that the legislative history demonstrates the
secular purpose. Senator David Scott had originally introduced the statute as
part of a "plan" of curbing violence among the city's youth.116 In testimony
before the court, Scott testified that violence and crime among and against the
youth was his motivation for introducing this legislation. 117 He further testified
that "'it was not an effort to bring prayer back into the schools.'"'118
Bown, on the other hand, insisted that the legislative history indicated that
the stated secular purpose of the Act was a sham. After the original bill had
legislature because of the long tradition of offering prayer before each session. See Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 785 (1983).1 12 Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools, Act No. 770, § 1, 1994 Ga. Laws 256,
256 (1994).
113 See Bown, 895 F. Supp. at 1574.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 See id. at 1567.
1 17 See . at 1574.
1 18 Id.
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passed the Senate, the bill eventually came up for vote in the House. House
members introduced two amendments to the Senate version of the bill. 119 The
Davis Amendment was twofold: (1) it provided for the present section (c) of
the Act, allowing for student-initiated, voluntary prayer; and (2) it created a
subsection (d) which permitted religious clubs to meet during non-school
hours. 120  Thirty-six members of the House sponsored the Davis
Amendment. 121 Both amendments passed the House and were sent to
Conference Committee. 122 Additionally, Bown presented transcripts of the
floor speeches of eight members of the House, all advocating the return of
prayer into the public schools. 12 Because of the support for the Davis
Amendment and the floor speeches calling for prayer to return to the
classroom, Bown contended that the secular purpose was a sham.
The district court, on the other hand, dismissed these elements as mere
"religious motives" of a few legislators. 124 The legislative motive of the statute
was relevant, not the subjective motives of individual legislators. Additionally,
the court noted that the Lemon test did not require a motivation that was wholly
secular: "'[A] statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may
satisfy the first criterion ... .'"125 A court should focus its inquiry on whether
the primary purpose of the statute is secular, not whether one religious intent
can be discovered.
Because the district court deemed the plain meaning of the language of the
statute and the legislative history of the statute indicative of its secular purpose,
the statute satisfied the first prong of the Lemon test.
2. Primary Effect
The court additionally found the second prong of the Lemon test, that of its
primary effect, satisfied by considering subsection (c) of the statute, the
legislative history, the language of the Act, and the administration of the Act
119 See id. at 1568.
12 0 See id. The other amendment considered by the House extended the moment of
reflection to 120 seconds from 60 seconds.
121 See id.
12 2 The conference committee removed the house amendments and sent the original
version of the senate bill back to the house. The senate adopted the committee version, but
the house rejected it. The bill then went to a second conference committee at which time
only subsection (c) of the Davis Amendment was accepted. See id.
123 See id. at 1574.
124 See id. at 1576.
125 Id. (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985)).
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under the facts in this case.
Initially, the court noted that not every law making reference to prayer
encourages or advances religion. 126 The consequence of the opposite conviction
would be to invalidate the National Day of Prayer, the words "under God" in
the pledge of allegiance, and the removal of "in God we trust" from
currency. 127 Although the state should avoid wading into the pond of religion,
complete and absolute separation of church and state is not possible because
some intrusion of the state is inevitable.
The Establishment Clause, according to this court, was not intended to
nullify all statutes which make reference to religion, but only those statutes
which have the effect of "'communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect,
whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality
or public perception, to status in the political community.'" 128 Moreover, the
court relied upon statements made by Justices Powell and O'Connor in their
concurring opinions in Jaffree, as evidence of the permissive effect of the
Georgia statute. In Jaffree, O'Connor hinted that moments of silence might be
constitutional because they were not inherently religious, and a pupil may
contemplate her own thoughts during the silence, without compromising her
own religious beliefs.129
The Georgia statute does not "endorse" a religion in any way because the
Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act is not associated with a religious
exercise. Subsection (b) of the Act makes it clear that pupils should not
consider the moment of quiet reflection as a religious service.130 The court then
noted that the record was devoid of any oral or audible prayers during the
moment of quiet reflection by any student or teacher.
Second, the court agreed with O'Connor's notion that during the moment
of silence no child need compromise his belief. "This moment of silence act in
no way favors the child who chooses to pray silently during a moment of
silence over the child who chooses to reflect on secular activities or no
126 See id. at 1577.
12 7 See id; supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
128 Id. at 1578 (emphasis added) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692
(1983)).
129 See id. at 1579 (quoting Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Justice Powell, in his concurrence, strongly endorsed O'Connor's reasoning. See Jaffree,
472 U.S. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring).
13 0 See Bown, 895 F. Supp. at 1579 (stating that a moment of silence "shall not be
conducted as a religious service or exercise but shall be considered as an opportunity for a
moment of silent reflection on the anticipated activities of the day." (quoting GA. CODE
ANN. § 20-2-1050(b) (1996))).
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activities at all for that matter." 131 The court gave credence to the concept of
neutrality. In its assessment, the court concluded that neither the religious
liberties of individuals nor the faint line separating church and state were
violated. A room of silent individuals does not enhance religion. 132
On the other hand, teacher Bown maintained that the Act was indeed
violative of the Establishment Clause, because the addition of subsection (c) to
the Act caused the state to endorse religion. Again, the court disagreed with
Bown, asserting the constitutionality of (c) for three reasons.
First, subsection (c) affirmatively authorized nothing. 133 It neither
implemented, favored, nor prohibited any activity, but rather only clarified that
the moment of reflection did not prevent prayer. The secular purpose of the Act
was actually strengthened by the inclusion of subsection (c), because it
differentiated and separated the authorized moment of reflection from student-
initiated prayer.134
Second, the court argued that the language of subsection (c) only clarified
the previous two subsections, thereby not requiring student prayer. 135 This
section of the statute merely states the type of prayer that will be tolerated.
Nowhere within subsection (c) does the legislature provide for a requirement
that students participate in prayer, a place for students to pray, the opportunity
for students to pray, or the existence of circumstances under which the students
are permitted to pray. The statute does not authorize students to lead other
students in prayer or permit the faculty to participate in a prayer. 136 "The
primary effect of subsection (c) is not to advance religion, or to convey a
government message endorsing religion, in contravention of Lemon's second
prong, but is only to clarify what subsections (a) and (b) do not prevent." 137
Third, the court argued in the alternative that if subsection (c) actually did
condone and endorse student-initiated prayer, it is still constitutionally sound
because it is in a larger Act which concentrates on a moment of reflection to
ponder the activities of the day. 138 Subsection (c) simply states that the Moment
of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act does not prevent student-initiated prayer.
Student-initiated prayer does not contravene Supreme Court precedence, for the
Supreme Court has never held student-led prayer as violative of the
131 Id.
132 See id. at 1579-81.
133 See id. at 1580.
134 See id. at 1580-81.
135 See id.
136 See id. at 1581.
137 Id.
13 8 See id.
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Establishment Clause. 139 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit had already upheld the
constitutionality of student-initiated graduation prayers. 140 Thus, this district
court understood these decisions to indicate that the focus had moved from
whether the student was voluntarily attending the school event to whether the
student was attending the school event for a religious exercise. 141
Subsection (c) does not state a place, a time, or circumstances under which
students should pray. Nor does the subsection authorize or implement prayer
into the school. It only recognizes that student-initiated prayer is not prevented
by the statute.142 Hence, "[t]here is little risk of official state endorsement or
entanglement where the Act does not set forth any time or opportunity for such
prayer, much less require or organize it." 143
Because the Georgia statute is not associated with a religious exercise,
because students do not compromise their religious beliefs by remaining silent
during the moment of reflection, and because of the constitutionality of
subsection (c), the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act does not have
the effect of endorsing religion and thus satisfies the second branch of the
tripartite Lemon test.
3. Excessive Government Entanglement
Finally, the court deemed the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act
as not requiring excessive government entanglement. It primarily relied upon
the same reasoning as stated in its evaluation of the "effect" prong of the
Lemon test. 144
Bown contended that excessive government entanglement would occur
because subsection (c) alludes only to nonsectarian and nonproselytizing
prayer. Bown asserted that the state, in this case school officials, would have to
monitor, thus intervene, to ensure that silent prayers of students are indeed
139 See id. at 1581, 1582 & n.21 (construing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
(holding unconstitutional the practice of a principal or other school official from choosing a
clergy to offer a prayer at graduation) and Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990) (upholding right of religious clubs to use public school facilities during nonschool
hours)).
140 See id. at 1582 n.23 (citing Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963
(5th Cir. 1992)).
141 See id. at 1583.
142 See id.
143Id.
144 See id. at 1583-84.
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nonsectarian and nonproselytizing. 145  This intervention would create
government entanglement. Moreover, Bown insisted that school officials would
have to intervene to monitor the students' compliance with the Act, and
guarantee that children are not audibly or orally reciting prayers. 146
The court, on the other hand, deemed Bown's arguments as having no
merit. First, Bown incorrectly expanded the Act beyond its limits. The Act did
not prohibit any prayers not of a nonsectarian and nonproselytizing nature, but
instead only stated that these types of prayers were permissible. 147 "Subsection
(c) states only what the moment of silence does not prevent, but does not
authorize, favor, or prohibit anything else." 148
Second, Bown based his argument on potential activities, not actual ones.
There existed in the record no instances of students orally or audibly reciting
prayers. The Act only authorizes silence and further prohibits schools from
conducting the silence as a religious exercise. In the words of the court, "The
State of Georgia would risk greater entanglement by attempting to enforce a
rule that prevented all student-initiated voluntary school prayer."1 49
Hence, because there was no evidence of the implementation of subsection
(c) and because the subsection only functioned to state what the previous two
sections did not prevent, there was no excessive government interference. The
Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act therefore satisfied the third prong
of the Lemon test.
C. Results
The result of this decision is to hold that moments of silence do not violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. According to this court, the
Georgia statute clearly had a secular, legislative purpose, the effect of the
statute was not to endorse religion, and excessive government entanglement
was nonexistent. Accordingly, the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act
satisfied all parts of the Lemon test.
As seen in Part IV of this Case Comment, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia erred in its validation of the Moment of
Quiet Reflection in Schools Act. The Act, as well as all legislatively mandated
moments of silence in public schools, is inherently contrary to the aims of the
Establishment Clause.
145 See id. at 1584.
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1586.
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IV. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF MOMENTS OF SILENCE
We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt
from its cognizance. True it is, that no other nle exists, by which any
question which may divide a Society, can be ultimately determined, but the
will of the majority; but is also true, that the majority may trespass on the
rights of the minority. 150
Moments of silence in public schools are gaining popularity as a means of
reinstituting prayer. Currently legislators in approximately twenty-five states
have enacted statutes authorizing these moments in schools. 151 The Moment of
Quiet Reflection in Schools Act is one instance of the majority trespassing on
the rights of the minority. The remainder of this Case Comment examines the
errors of the district court and definitively concludes that the statute is
unconstitutional under the three-prong Lemon test. 152
15 0 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1, 1.
151 Moment of silence statutes vary throughout the states. Some statutes mandate that
all schools within the states allow for a period of silence or voluntary prayer, while other
statutes allow individual school districts to use discretion in establishing these acts. Those
statutes which authorize these moments at the state level are as follows: ALA. CODE § 16-1-
20 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4101A(b) (Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105, §
20/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5308a (1992); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC.
§ 7-104 (1992 & Supp. 1995); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 71, § IA (1994); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 388.075 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-4 (West 1989) (held unconstitutional in May
v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985), appeal dismissed, sub nom. Karcher v. May,
484 U.S. 72 (1987)); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-27-3 (Michie Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 15-47-30.1 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1004 (Supp. 1995). Those statutes allowing
local school boards to establish periods of silence are as follows: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15-342(21) (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-16a (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 233.062(2) (West 1989); IND. CODE § 20-10.1-7-11 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:2115 (West Supp. 1996); ME. REy. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 4805(2) (West 1993);
MiCH. CoM. LAWS § 380.1565 (1988); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3029-a (McKinney 1995);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-47(29) (Supp. 1995); 24 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 15-1516.1
(1992); TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.082(b) (West Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-
203 (Michie 1993).
152 Notwithstanding recent Supreme Court opinions casting doubt on the future of the
Lemon test, the Eleventh Circuit continues to use the Lemon test as the correct method in
determining violations of the Establishment Clause. See lager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist.,
862 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir. 1989).
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A. Secular Purpose5 3
In order to pass constitutional muster under this first prong of the tripartite
Lemon test, the statute must not possess an actual purpose which "endorse[s] or
disapprove[s] of religion." 154 A law is not unconstitutional just because its
purpose "merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or
all religions," 155 nor is a law which "confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or
'incidental' benefit upon religious institutions" unconstitutional for that
purpose, alone.156 A law does not even require an exclusive secular
objective. 157 The state must only be able to justify the action in secular
terms. 158 Although the single statements of a legislator inserted into the record
should not invalidate an otherwise secular bill, 159 courts must scrutinize stated
legislative purposes to ensure that the secular purpose is not a sham. 160 "The
relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text,
legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a
state endorsement of prayer in public schools." 161
Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in Public Schools Act possesses a
religious purpose, namely to reinstitute prayer into the public schools.
Although the preamble to the Act states a secular purpose, the legislative intent,
the insertion of subsection (c) into the Act, the time of day set aside for the
153 Two problems may exist with invalidating laws based on the existence of religious
purpose. First, a law with a religious purpose may be used to invalidate laws whose affects
are wholly secular. Second, the lack of a secular purpose might invalidate acts of
legislatures which aim to "equalize religious burdens or otherwise to advance free exercise
values." TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-9, at 1211.
154 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, ., concurring) ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks
whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect
prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review
in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either
question should render the challenged practice invalid.")).
155 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
156 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771
(1973) (citations omitted).157 See Jafflee, 472 U.S. at 56, 64 (Powell, J., concurring).
158 See TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-8, at 1204.
159 See Jaffee, 472 U.S. at 65 (Powell, J., concurring).
160 See id. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
(finding stated legislative purpose for statute requiring posting of Ten Commandments in
public classrooms a sham).16 1 Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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moment of silence, the legislative history, and the operative effect of the Act
indicate otherwise.
First, the legislative intent stated by Georgia's state legislature is a sham,
disguising the actual religious intent of the Act. The Supreme Court has
recognized the existence of sham purposes and has stated that an "avowed"
secular purpose is able to violate the Establishment Clause. 162 In Stone v.
Graham,163 the Court invalidated a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of
the Ten Commandments in every public classroom within the state. 164
Kentucky argued that the statute possessed a secular purpose, because the
legislature had required each posting to contain wording that indicated
nonreligious means for the display. 165 The Court reasoned, however, that
posting the Ten Commandments was clearly for religious purposes, for the
Decalogue is seen as a symbolic and sacred part of the Judeo-Christian belief
system. 166 Within the words of the Commandments themselves are contained
the religious duties of worshippers. Additionally, the Court noted that this was
not an instance where the schools were using the Bible to study history,
cultures, or religion. "If the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to
have any effect at all, it will be to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate
upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments. However desirable
this might be as a matter of private devotion, it is not a permissible state
objective under the Establishment Clause." 167
Like the stated legislative purpose for the display of the Ten
Commandments in Grahan, the actual purpose of Georgia's Moment of Quiet
Reflection Act is one of religious endorsement. "Prayer" is solely a religious
activity, for there exists no nonreligious purpose for prayer. 168 The Bible, the
162 See Graham, 449 U.S. at 41-42; see also Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, I.,
concurring).
163 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
164 See id. at 39-40.
165 "'The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption
as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United
States.'" Id. at 41 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.178(2) (Michie 1992)).
166 See id.
167 Id. at 42.
168 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) ("'The religious nature of
prayer was recognized by Jefferson and has been concurred in by theological writers, the
United States Supreme Court and state courts and administrative officials ..... ) (quoting
Engel v. Vitale, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 468-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959)); Jesse H. Choper,
Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329,
335 (1963) ("[Qlther practices, such as prayer recitation and Bible reading, inust be fairly
characterized as solely religious activities having no independent primary nonreligious
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principle text upon which the Christian faith relies, states the importance of
prayer in the Christian faith.169 Moreover, in subsection (c) of the Act of the
Georgia state legislature, the legislature makes clear that prayer is not
prohibited during that moment of quiet reflection each morning.1 70 Explaining
to school districts, teachers, and students that prayer is not prohibited during a
moment of silence singles out the nonsecular act of one religion. Why does
subsection (c) of the statute not stipulate that those of the Buddhist faith may
meditate to Buddha during this period? Like the posting of the Ten
Commandments in Graham, the singling out of prayer, if it is to have any
effect at all, "it will be to induce the schoolchildren" to worship the Christian
God, possibly to introduce them to the Bible, and possibly even to convert a
non-Christian to Christianity. Moreover, aside from converting a non-Christian
to a Christian, the recognition of prayer encourages religion over
nonreligion. 171 This encouragement is equally as contrary to the aims of the
First Amendment. "However desirable this might be as a matter of private
devotion, it is not a permissible state objective under the Establishment
Clause."172
Hence, the inherent nature of prayer indicates a religious purpose. Because
the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Public Schools Act singles out prayer as one
activity not prohibited by the statute, the legislature has indicated prayer as a
favored activity within that time span. A religious purpose is thus expressed.
Second, the addition of subsection (c) to the Moment of Quiet Reflection in
Schools Act serves no purpose other than to encourage religion. In Wallace v.
Jaffree, the Court was confronted with a similar moment of silence statute in
Alabama. 173 The specific statute at issue calling for "'meditation or voluntary
purpose. Their exclusive primary goal is to inculcate the students with religious and spiritual
ideals or to assist in such inculcation.").
169 See Matthew 21:22 ('And whatever you ask in prayer, you will receive if you
have faith."); cf School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963) (stating the
inherent relationship between the Bible and religion).
170 For text of the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act, see supra text
accompanying note 99.
171 Encouraging religion over nonreligion is seemingly as contrary to the aims of
the Establishment Clause as encouraging one religion over another. See Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (stating no state or federal government has
the power through the Establishment Clause to encourage religion); Lee v. Weisman,
560 U.S. 577 (1992) (invalidating administration-led graduation prayer, because, inter
alia, it would force a nonbeliever to participate in religious orthodoxy).
172 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980).
173 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985). The text of the statute called for a
moment of silence "'not to exceed one minute in duration ... for meditation or voluntary
prayer, and during any such period no other activities shall be engaged in.'" Id. at 40 n.2
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prayer'" was identical to the statute it replaced in every respect, with the
exception of the addition of the words "'or voluntary prayer.'" 174 The Court
reasoned that the right of voluntary prayer already existed in the previous
statute, for there was no language preventing a student from voluntarily
praying. 175 The amending of the statute to provide for "voluntary prayer," the
Court continued, could only be the result of one of two possibilities: (1) to
convey a message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the
statute was enacted for no purpose. 176 Because no party claimed that the
legislature had irrationally enacted the meditation statute for no reason, the only
plausible purpose for the addition of subsection (c) was for religious
encouragement. 177
In the same respect as the statute enacted in Jaffree, there was no need for
the amendment allowing for subsection (c) of Georgia's Moment of Quiet
Reflection in Schools Act. The original bill proposed and passed by the Senate
contained only subsections (a) and (b). No preamble was attached, nor any
language stating that prayer was not prevented during the opening moment of
silence. The statute simply stated that each day a moment of quiet reflection
existed during which students were to reflect on the activities of the day. 178
According to the preamble, added concurrently with subsection (c), the General
Assembly enacted the law because "our young, and society as a whole, would
be well served if students were afforded a moment of quiet reflection at the
beginning of each school day in the public schools." 179 Accepting arguendo,
that the stated legislative purpose is the true intent of the law, then no change in
intent occurred with the addition of subsection (c) discussing the non-
prohibition of prayer. Like the addition of the statute in Jaffree, the addition of
subsection (c) demonstrates a desire to "characterize prayer as a favored
practice." 180
Moreover, individual, student-initiated prayer and religious expression is
already permissible within the public schools, as long as it is not disruptive to
others.181 In 1995, President Clinton issued to Attorney General Janet Reno a
(quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)).
174 Id. at 58-59.
175 See id.
176 See id. at 59.
177 See id.
17 8 See supra text accompanying note 98 for subsections (a) and (b) of the statute.
179 For text of the preamble, see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
180 Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 58-59.
181 See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 246-47 (1990) (allowing student
religious organizations equal access to school facilities after school hours as nonreligious
organizations); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1952) (allowing release of
students from public schools to attend off-campus religious services). But see Illinois =. rel.
1428 [Vol. 57:1399
]SIENCE BEGETS RELIGION
memorandum concerning religious expression in the schools. 182 Commanding
Attorney General Reno to inform school districts about religion in the schools,
the President explained the freedom that does exist:
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit purely
private religious speech by students. Students therefore have the same right to
engage in individual or group prayer and religious discussion during the school
day as they do to engage in other comparable activity. For example, students
may read their Bibles or other scriptures, say grace before meals, and pray
before tests to the same extent they may engage in comparable nondisruptive
activities. Local school authorities possess substantial discretion to impose
rules of order and other pedagogical restrictions on student activities, but they
may not discriminate against religious activity or speech. 183
The President continued, stating that the right to exercise religious beliefs
in schools does not include the right to "have a captive audience listen or to
compel other students to participate." 184 Thus, according to the President's
understanding, students have a right to pray in schools, if they so choose. They
may not, however, force others to join.
By the addition of subsection (c) to the Moment of Quiet Reflection in
Schools Act, nothing was accomplished. As discovered through Supreme Court
precedent and the Presidential Memorandum, students already had the right to
pray during school hours, as long as prayer was not part of the official school
day. Using the reasoning of the Jaffree Court, there are only two possible
reasons for the inclusion of subsection (c): "(1) the statute was enacted to
convey a message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the
statute was enacted for no purpose." 185 As in Jaffree, no one in the present
case has stated that subsection (c) was enacted for no reason. Hence, only one
explanation exists for its addition: the state endorsement of prayer.
Because the stated purpose of the statute was the same before and after the
addition of subsection (c) to the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act,
the only rational explanation for its existence is to promote prayer.
Third, the legislative history of the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools
Act reveals the Act's actual nonsecular intent. Remembering that the comments
of one or a few legislators carefully placed within the record should not be able
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227-28 (1948) (denying release of students
from secular studies to attend religious classes on school premises, during school hours).182 President's Memorandum on Religious Expression in Schools, 31 WEEKLY CoMP.
PRns. Doc. 1227 (July 12, 1995).
183 Id. at 1228.
184 Id.
185 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985).
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to invalidate the existence of a secular purpose, 186 the courts have searched the
history behind the enactment of "moment of silence" statutes in an effort to
discover a secular purpose. An examination of the statute in the present case
additionally demonstrates the existence of a religious purpose.187
The original senate bill, as introduced by Senator Scott, called for school
prayer in the classroom.' 88 According to Scott, himself, the only reason the
legislature removed the reference to "silent prayer" was to increase the
possibility of its surviving constitutional scrutiny. 189 One might reasonably
discern from this action that Scott saw no objection to prayer in the public
schools when he introduced the bill. Why else would he not remove the
reference to prayer at the bill's introduction? Prayer is certainly not necessary
to "reflect on the day's activities." The possibility exists that Scott approved of
prayer in schools, and only removed the reference to prayer in order to make
the bill more appeasing to the Establishment Clause.190
Additionally, the Georgia House of Representatives made no secret of their
purpose to return prayer to the public classroom. When the house first
introduced Senate Bill 396, the representatives inserted two amendments before
passing the measure. 191 The Davis Amendment provided for, inter alia, the
present subsection (c) stating the nonprohibition of voluntary prayer during the
moment of quiet reflection. 192 Despite the efforts of the house sponsors of
186 See id. at 65 (Powell, j., concurring).
187 Although the district court made note of a recorded floor debate in the Georgia
House of Representatives, the author was unsuccessful in locating it. The author contacted
both the district court and the house, and neither place was able to give assistance. The
author must therefore rely on secondary sources in discussing the legislative history of the
Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act.
188 See Leila Ann G. Lawlor, ELementary, Secondary, and Adult Education: Require a
Moment of Quiet Reflection at the Opening of Each School Day; Prevent Prohibition of
Student-Initiated, Voluntary Prayer at Schools and School-Related Events, 11 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 187 (1994); John Sommer, 'Quiet Reflection' Bill Way to Curb Violence or Avenue for
Prayer? Public Debate Rages on 32 Years After Landmark Supreme Court Decision,
ATLANrA 1. & CONST., Feb. 20, 1994, at J9; see also Bill Ranldn, Meditation in School
Georgia Plan Could Get Nod from High Court, ATLANTA J. & CoNsT., Feb. 22, 1994, at
A5 (ACLU noting the irony of Georgia altering a statute which initially called for voluntary
school prayer).
189 See Lawlor, supra note 188, at 190.
190 Cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-57 (1985) (noting that the sponsor of the
proposed Alabama moment of silence statute expressly stated in the record that the bill
was an effort to return prayer to the public schools).
191 See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
192 See Bown v. Gwimiett County Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp. 1564, 1568 (N.D. Ga.
1995); Lawlor, supra note 188, at 191 (noting that "many representatives insisted the bill
1430 [Vol. 57:1399
SILENCE BEGETS RELIGION
Senate Bill 396 to steer floor debate away from the issue of prayer, the house
overwhelmingly desired a reference to prayer.19 3 "House members... offered
up fiery speeches linking the end of school prayer to a drop in test scores and
rising crime." 194 According to the district court, at least eight representatives
orated in support of reintroducing prayer into the public classrooms. 195
The Georgia House of Representatives overwhelmingly supported the
Davis Amendment referring to school prayer by a 119 to 48 vote.196 The
passage of the Davis Amendment is indicative of the house's intent to restore
prayer into the public schools. This affirmance, combined with the orations by
many representatives linking the silence to prayer, demonstrates that this is not
an instance of a single legislator inserting comments into the record, 197 but
rather an instance of the majority of representatives supporting the re-
emergence of prayer in public schools.
The house approved Senate Bill 396 with the inclusion of the Davis
Amendment by a 164 to 10 vote. 198 The senate, however, rejected the house's
version of the bill and returned it to the house as it originally existed without
the amendments. The house then rejected the senate version by a vote of 75 to
94.199 The defeat of the conference committee's bill suggests that the majority
of the house were in support of the Davis Amendment which contained a
blatant religious purpose.
Once the bill emerged from a second conference committee with part of the
Davis Amendment intact, the house finally approved the Moment of Quiet
Reflection in Schools Act.2°°
The original version of Senate Bill 396, the house floor debates calling for
the return of prayer in the public classroom, and the house insistence on the
inclusion of the Davis Amendment in the final version of the bill all indicate
the religious purpose of the moment of quiet reflection.
Fourth, the time of day reserved for the moment of quiet reflection
proffered in the Act, is indicative of an effort to reintroduce prayer into the
contain some reference to school prayer and refused to pass the bill as written").193 See Ben Smith I" & Charles Walston, Bill Allowing Student Led Prayers in School
Clears Georgia House, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 4, 1994, at Al.
194 Betsy White, Georgia's Moment of Refection Crash Course in Quiet" Teachers are
Troubled About Possible Lawsuits and Reflect on Ways to Prevent Them, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Aug. 18, 1994, at Cl.
195 See Bown, 895 F. Supp. at 1575.
196 See Smith & Walston, supra note 193, at Al.
197 See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
198 See Smith & Walston, supra note 193, at Al.
199 See Bown, 895 F. Supp. at 1568.
200 See id.
19961 1431
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNVAL
schools. 20 1 "[A] statute that requires or permits a moment of silence to occur at
precisely the same time of day at which prayer previously occurred evinces a
religious purpose."202 Since the Civil War, religion was manifested into the
public schools, through prayer, during the opening moments of the day. 203
Indeed, the challenged prayers in Engel, Schempp, and Jaffree all occurred
during the morning exercises. 204 Providing for moments of silence within this
same period is nothing more than an effort to reestablish prayer in the public
schools.
In this same way, the state of Georgia, prior to the current moment of
reflection act, authorized prayer in the morning exercises of the school day. 205
Although the Georgia legislature repealed this law, they installed the current
Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act in its place. The moment of quiet
reflection act also requires silence at the same time prayer was traditionally
allowed: the commencement of the school day. Conceivably, the Georgia
legislature could have indicated any part of the day to maintain quiet reflection,
but chose to require the moment during the traditional time for prayer.20 6 The
requirement for the moment of quiet reflection to occur at precisely the
traditional time for school prayer is yet a third indicia of a nonsecular purpose.
And finally, the operative effect of Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection
in Schools Act demonstrates the religious intent of the bill. "[S]ecular purpose
is most effectively tested by reference to the actual impact of a legislative
action: if the obvious effect of a statute is to advance or hinder a particular
religious interest, then the state's purpose is necessarily less believably
2 0 1 See Note, The Unconstitutionality of State Statutes Authouizing Moments of Silence
in the Public Schools, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1874, 1881 (1983).202 Id.
203 See id. at n.44 (citing W. GRIFFrTHs, RELIGION, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC
SCHooLS §§ 1.1-2.4 (1966)).2 04 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 nn.1-3 (1985); School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962); see also Beck v.
McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161, 1161 (M.D. Tenn. 1982), vacated, sub nom. Beck v.
Alexander, 718 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1983) (challenging a morning moment of silence in
public schools). But see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992) (challenging an
administration-initiated graduation prayer).
205 See supra note 98 for the text of the law which was repealed and replaced by the
challenged statute.
206 See Note, supra note 201, at 1881 ("A moment of silence for a secular purpose
might logically have been mandated at any of a number of points in the day, such as
following recess or lunchtime, or the timing might simply have been left to the discretion of
the teacher.").
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secular." 20 7 Although the Court has not employed this test in many
Establishment Clause challenges, it has used this operative effect test in at least
one case.
208
The McGowan Court reasoned that Sunday closing laws were
constitutional after examining the purpose of closing laws in society at that
time:
We do not hold that Sunday legislation may not be a violation of the
Establishment Clause if it can be demonstrated that its purpose-evidenced
either on the face of the legislation, in conjunction with its legislative history,
or in its operative effect-is to use the State's coercive power to aid
religion. 2 9
This type of analysis for Establishment Clause challenges is necessary,
because the First Amendment rights are fundamental in the United States'
constitutional system.210
The effect of Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act is to
promote religion in public schools. The influence of legislation of this nature is
likely to be interpreted as a religious ritual in the southern United States,
regardless of the other language of the statute. In a poll completed in 1994,
nearly half of all Southerners believed that the United States was a Christian
nation, compared to only one third outside of the South who agreed with this
statement. 211 In the Deep South, 53% of the respondents believed that
Christian laws should govern the United States, and 80% of Southerners-as
opposed to 60% of non-Southerners-believe that Jesus will revisit the
Earth.2 12 Because the South has deep religious convictions, the operative effect
of the statute in Georgia is to "advance... a particular religious... interest."
The religious nature of the statute is additionally seen in the reaction by the
citizens of Georgia. Religious leaders hailed the Moment of Quiet Reflection in
Schools Act as a "godsend" for Christian children in the public schools and
207 Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Ctwice: A Consistent Understanding of
Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. Ci. L. REv. 805, 824-25 (1978).
208 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1960). For the facts of
McGowan, see supra note 42.209 Id.
210 See Merel, supra note 207, at 827 ("[A]t least some degree of means scrutiny
should be required in order to prevent any unnecessary effects in matters of religion.").
211 See Ben Smith, God and the South: Southern Life Poll, ATLANTA J. & CoNsT.,
May 22, 1994, at A8.
2 12 See id.
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urged parents to provide prayers to their children for the moment of silence.213
A few students in Brian Bown's classroom placed Bibles on their desks to read
during the moment of silence.214 Another student bowed her head in prayer.2 15
The motive of the law was questioned by the legislators' very constituents.2 16
Hence, the operative effect of the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act is
to promote religion in the public schools through prayer.
Because the nature of prayer is inherently religious, the addition of
subsection (c) serves only to emphasize prayer as a favored action, the moment
of reflection is at the traditional time of prayer, and the operative effect is to
influence religion in individuals' lives, the Moment of Quiet Reflection in
Schools Act possesses a nonsecular purpose.
B. Primary Effect
The second factor of the three-prong Lemon test is the requirement that the
primary effect of the challenged statute be secular. Courts should invalidate
policies which have the central effect of either positively or negatively
influencing religion.217 Although, as a practical matter, a statute may have the
primary effect of causing the inhibition of or advancement of religion, the test
must evaluate if the government practice advances a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion.218 "It is only practices having that
effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in
reality or public perception, to status in the political community." 219
Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act does advance a
message of governmental endorsement of Christianity. Examination of the
effect of the statute should go beyond the mere study of the language of the
statute to the actual effect on those individuals within its jurisdiction.220 By
questioning the effect of the moment of reflection on the schools, the classroom
2 13 See Diane Loupe, Chrisan Workshop Leaders See Law as Welcome First Step,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 27, 1994, at 11.2 14 See Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp. 1564, 1569-70 (1995).
215 See id; see also Loupe, supra note 213, at J1.
216 See Jerry L. Brantley, Jr., Southside Voices Readers' Letters, ATLANTA 1. &
CoNsT., Sept. 15, 1994, at 16; John Sommer, Moment of Silence All's Not Quiet on the
School Front, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 4, 1994, at J13; Sommer, supra note 188, at
19.
217 See TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-10, at 1214.
218 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984).
219 Id. at 692.
220 See Note, supra note 201, at 1888.
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teacher, and the students, one can discern the governmental endorsement of
religion.221
First, state compulsory education laws demonstrate the governmental
endorsement of religion in the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act.222
In McCollwn, the Court considered an Illinois statute providing for the release
of students from their secular studies during school hours, in order to attend
religious classes. Those students not desiring to take part in the religious
classes were permitted to pursue secular subjects in another part of the
school.223 In declaring the statute unconstitutional, the Court noted the close
connection between the religious instruction and the school authorities. The
school was providing tax-supported property to encourage and spread religious
faith to the students of the school. 224 These same students were compelled by
state law to attend school. "The operation of the State's compulsory education
system thus assists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction
carried on by separate religious sects." 225 Moreover, the Court cited with
approval the broad prohibition expounded by the Everson Court demanding
complete and absolute separation of state and religion.226 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Frankfurter addressed the "alternative" available for students
wishing not to take part in the religious training. He reasoned that the existence
of an alternative did not necessarily lessen the influence of the school's practice
on the child. 227 The result is a pressure to conform to the majority and attend
the religious classes. 228
Like the statute in McCollwn, the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools
Act is using the state's compulsory education laws to inculcate school children
with pressure to pray during the moment of reflection at the commencement of
the school day. First, the compulsory education law of the state of Georgia
forces a nonreligious, non-Christian, or non-praying religious person to endure
a moment of silence allowing for religious individuals to pray. By permitting
Christian students to pray during this period, the government, through the
school, assists religious individuals with time to pray "through use of the
state's compulsory public school machinery. This assistance is not a separation
221 See id. at 1888-93.
222 See id.
223 See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,205 (1948).
224 See id. at 209-10.
225 Id. at 209.
226 See id. at 210-11 & nn.6-7.
227 See id. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
228 See id.
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of Church and State."229 As noted earlier, the addition of subsection (c) into
the Georgia statute served no purpose but to further religion. 23 0 Under the Free
Exercise Clause, the government already may not prohibit a student from
praying at any time during the day. 231 Hence, the addition of subsection (c)
singles out prayer as a preferred, endorsed, government action during the
moment of reflection. In this way, the state is employing "the tax-established
and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faith." 23 2
Because of the compulsory education laws, students are forced to endure
the moment of silence imposed upon them in the public schools. By singling
out "prayer" as an acceptable activity within the moment of reflection, the
Georgia legislature has created and endorses a religious atmosphere in the
school.
Second, the classroom teacher, more than any other person in the public
school, has a great influence on the daily lives of the students. To the students,
the teacher is representative of the "established order," deserving respect and
reverence because of her position.23 3 Merely by reciting the words of the
statute to the student, the teacher can inadvertently promote religion.
Children of the elementary or high school age are unusually susceptible to
influence on religious choice.23 4 In Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools, the
district court dealt with a New Mexico statute authorizing individual school
229 Id. at 212.
23 0 See supra notes 173-84 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
232 See McCollwn, 333 U.S. at 210.
233 See Note, supra note 201, at 1889 n.89 (construing R. DAWSON, ET AL., PoLmCAL
SOcIALizATION 149-50 (2d ed. 1977)).
23 4 See Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Ind. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038,
1045 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting the "impressionability of secondary and primnay age school
children"); Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1981)
("[S]ecular involvement in religious activities in the institutionally coercive setting of
primary and secondary schools, then, is alone sufficient to satisfy this prong of the Lemon v.
Kurzran test."); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Our
nation's elementary and secondary schools play a unique role in transmitting basic and
fundamental values to our youth. To an impressionable student, even the mere appearance
of secular involvement in religious activities might indicate that the state has placed its
imprimatur on a particular religious creed."); Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 557 F. Supp.
1013, 1016 (D.N.M. 1983) ("The dangers inherent in the sovereign placing its imprimatur
on a religious exercise are particularly acute where children are involved."); Choper, supra
note 168, at 337.
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districts to establish moments of silence within their own districts.23 5 In its
invalidation of the statute, the court examined the perceived effect of the statute
on the students. The court noted that if the community perceived the enactment
of the statute to be a religious exercise, then the State had advanced religion.236
In examining the effect of the policy to discover if the school board had
furthered or inhibited religion, the court understood the importance of
perception: "The debates leading to the adoption of the moment of silence left
the clear impression that the issue was prayer in the public schools in the minds
of both its supporters and opponents." 23 7 This impression, when combined
with the impressionable minds of the elementary and high school youth, created
an impermissible advancement of religion.23 8
Like the statute in Duffy, the Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act
encountered much debate before its actual implementation. 23 9 Both proponents
and opponents of the moment of quiet reflection tended to equate the statute
with prayer. Thus, on the first day of class, many students interpreted Brian
Bown's refusal to allow the moment of silence as a refusal to allow prayer.240
Teachers were also seen in prayer. These facts, combined with the religious
nature of the SoUth, 241 creates the effect of the advancement of religion in the
minds of the impressionable youth.
Third, the effect of the moment of silence is to indirectly coerce
nonreligious individuals into a religious conformance by the state.242 Like the
prayer dissenters in Lee v. Weisman,243 students in Georgia should not feel
235 The text of the New Mexico statute stated the following:
Each local school board may authorize a period of silence not to exceed one minute at
the beginning of the school day. This period may be used for contemplation, meditation
or prayer, provided that silence is maintained and no activities are undertaken.
Duffy, 557 F. Supp. at 1014 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.1 (Michie 1978)).
23 6 See id. at 1016.
237 Id. at 1020.
23 8 See id. at 1020-21.
239 See supra notes 186-206 and accompanying text.
240 One student stated that Bown's actions prevented her from praying. Another
student ran out of Bown's afternoon class shouting, "'the Lord Jesus is my Savior.'" Two
students in Bown's homeroom placed Bibles on their desk. A teacher bowed his head in
prayer. See Diane Loupe, South Teacher Breaks Silence with Protest, ATLANTA I. &
CoNST., Aug. 23, 1994, at J1.
241 See supra notes 211-12.
242 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
243 See 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992); supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
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compelled to pray during this morning minute of silence. "What to most
believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever
respect their religious practices, in a school context may appear to the
nonbelievers or dissenters to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the state
to enforce a religious orthodoxy."2 44 The mere act of remaining silent for a
minute while giving others the opportunity to pray, in essence, forces the
dissenter to participate in religion. The fact that the state of Georgia is setting
time apart from the school day to allow prayer to take place subtly coerces a
nonbelieving student towards religion.
Because of Georgia's state compulsory education laws, the impressionable
nature of children, the religious interpretation of the statute by students and
teachers, and the subtle coercion towards religion, the effect of the Moment of
Quiet Reflection in Schools Act was to advance religion. The district court
erred in declaring the act constitutional.
C. Excessive Government Entanglement
The third and final prong of the Lemon test fosters excessive governmental
entanglement into religious issues.245 Excessive governmental entanglement
addresses the Madisonian view that religious and secular bodies should not
interfere within the sphere of authority of the other.246 In creating a statute
respecting religion, Congress must not provide for excessive involvement of
the government nor a continuing role for official and constant surveillance.247
The question of entanglement is one of degree, and normally appears in the
form of administrative entanglement or political divisiveness. 248 Mandatory
moments of silence in public schools foster this excessive governmental
entanglement. Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act violates
244/Id.
245 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
246 See TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-11, at 1226.
247 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
248 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615, 622; TRIBE, supra note 9, § 14-11, at 1229-30 n.31;
see also Note, supra note 201, at 1878 n.28. Although one could make the argument that
political divisiveness on a religious level does exist on account of the statute, the Supreme
Court has been reluctant in extending this doctrine to non-monetary policies. See Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983). But see
Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 557 F. Supp. 1013, 1021 (D.N.M. 1983) (finding political
divisiveness as an element of excessive governmental entanglement, thereby invalidating a
state moment of silence law).
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the prohibition of excessive governmental entanglement in the administrative
aspect.
The moment of quiet reflection requires administrative entanglement
because it requires governmental surveillance, monitoring, and administration
in the observance of the moment. As stated earlier, the two statutes at issue in
Lemon concerned (1) state authorization to supplement the salary of a non-
public school teacher in her instruction in secular courses, and (2) state
authorization to supplement nonpublic schools for the expenses associated with
salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular courses. 249 In
determining that both statutes did indeed involve excessive governmental
entanglement, and thus violated the Establishment Clause, the Court first
concentrated on the necessary administrative surveillance.
After noting the close relationship between religion and parochial schools,
the Court reasoned that surveillance was necessary in order to assure that
teachers who received the salary supplement did not teach religious ideals
whatsoever in their secular subjects. A potential hazard existed in which
teachers of secular subjects could inject religious doctrine into their secular
teachings. 25 0 Combined with the impressionable age of students, the potential
for religious indoctrination would require governmental surveillance. The
Court recognized the difficulty for religious individuals to teach secular
subjects without inserting, even subconsciously, religious ideals.251 Moreover,
there was inherent difficulty in "the combination of religious discipline and the
possibility of disagreement between teacher and religious authorities over the
meaning of the statutory restrictions." 25 2 In order to assuage these concerns,
state surveillance was necessary to ensure no violation of the Establishment
Clause and teacher obedience with the statute. 25 3 This surveillance is the very
type of administrative entanglement prohibited by the First Amendment.
Like the statutes in Lemon, Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in
Schools Act requires state surveillance to ensure no violation of the statute for
two reasons. First, Gwinnett County School District in Georgia promulgated an
administrative bulletin describing to all teachers how to handle the moment of
reflection each morning.25 4 In part, the bulletin described the correct procedure
249 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607, 609.
250 See id. at 618.
251 "What would appear to some to be essential to good citizenship might well for
others border on or constitute instruction in religion." Id at 619.
2 52 Id.
253 See id.
25 4 See Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp. 1564, 1569 (N.D. Ga.
1995); see also Diane Loupe, Silence Golden in Moment of Reflection, ATLANTA I. &
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teachers should follow each day and suggested answers to probable questions of
students concerning the religious undertone of the statute. The bulletin,
however, additionally noted the necessity of teachers not to suggest or imply
that this time was to be used for prayer: "It is important that we recommend
that teachers and administrators do not suggest or imply that students should or
should not use that time for prayer."255
The administrative bulletin is not the only evidence of governmental
entanglement into religion caused by the statute. Fulton County, Georgia issued
a script to be followed each day,25 6 as did Gwinnett County,25 7 and even the
Georgia School Board Association issued recommendations that individual
schools not permit teachers, staff, or students to pray audibly.25 8 Moreover,
school attorneys and administrators issued legal advice on the proper way to
conduct the moment of quiet reflection.25 9
Although this prohibition of suggesting prayer exists, some teachers who
are very religious may imply prayer from their actions. For example, a math
teacher in Brian Bown's school "bowed his head and closed his eyes during the
moment." 260 These actions by this math teacher are the universal sign of
prayer, a religious activity. 261 As the Lemon Court noted, children are at a
very impressionable age and may be easily influenced by the actions of a
teacher. 262 Despite the attempts to avoid staff and administrator endorsement of
prayer, and therefore religion, the very thing the Lemon Court feared has
occurred: religious individuals who are teachers still display religious
indoctrination. As an editorial by the Atlanta Journal and Constitution stated:
"Who will police teachers in the state's 1,717 public schools to make sure they
CoNST., Aug. 22, 1994, at J1.
255 Bown, 895 F. Supp. at 1569. The bulletin continued, stating: "If a student asks, a
teacher should advise student that if the student desires to have a quiet prayer, he or she
may do so." Id.
256 "We will now pause for the next forty seconds for a brief period of quiet
reflection," and then after the forty seconds has expired, "Thank you. Have a good day."
Betsy White, Georgia's Moment of Reflection Crash Course in Quiet, ATLANTA I. &
CoNST., Aug. 18, 1994, at Cl.
257 "'As we begin our day, let us take a few moments to reflect quietly on our day,
our activities and what we hope to accomplish.'" Bown, 895 F. Supp. at 1569.
258 See Loupe, supra note 254, at 11.
259 See White, supra note 256 at Cl; Betsy White, As the Pupils Reflect, Their
Teachers Worry, ATLANTA I. & CONST., Aug. 18, 1994, at Al.
260 Diane Loupe, South Teacher Breaks Silence with Protest, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Aug. 23, 1994, at Jl.
261 See supra note 168 and accompanying text for a discussion that prayer is inherently
a religious activity.
262 See also supra note 234.
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are in compliance? How would that be done?" 263
The object of criticism in the editorial is the very point that the Lemon
Court feared. In order to insure school compliance with the statute, "[a]
comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably
be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First
Amendment otherwise respected." 264 It does not matter whether teachers
actually are praying during the moment of reflection or whether students have
been influenced by the religious actions of their teachers, because the potential
exists for both of these concerns to materialize. As the Lemon Court could not
ignore the potential for religious teachers to insert religious doctrine into the
teaching of secular courses,265 the Georgia courts cannot ignore the potential
for religious teachers to insert religious indoctrination into the moment of
silence by their actions. "Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so
as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and
subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment."266
A constant surveillance is necessary. This periodic contact with the teachers
and schools would inevitably result in entanglement between church and
state.2
67
263 Editorial, Leaders Should Reflect for a Moment, ATLANTA J. & CoNST., Feb. 25,
1994, at A6.
264 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
2 65 See id. at 617.
2 66 Id. at 619.
267 An additional argument may be made indicating that government surveillance is
necessary in order to ensure that prayers authorized by subsection (c) of the Moment of
Quiet Reflection in Schools Act are "nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature." See
supra note 99 and accompanying text for entire text of the statute. This argument, however,
is more difficult, because student-initiated school prayer has not been held unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court. Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588-89 (1992) ("The
question is not the good faith of the school in attempting to make the [graduation] prayer
acceptable to most persons, but the legitimacy of its undertaking that enterprise at all [by the
principal selecting a clergyman] when the object is to produce a prayer to be used in a
formal religious exercise....") with Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-33 (1962)
(invalidating the New York law authorizing state sponsored Regent's prayer). Moreover,
the surveillance of nonsectarian and nonproselytizing prayer at school events, such as
graduation or baccalaureate, would not be continuous in the same degree as the daily
moment of quiet reflection present in the Georgia statute.
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V. CONCLUSION
"[A] government will be best supported by protecting every citizen in the enjoyment of
his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his person and his property; by
neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those of
another." 26 8
Moments of quiet reflection in public school classrooms are one last effort
by state legislatures to reinstitute religious prayer into the public schools. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia erred in its
validation of Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act, for the Act
fails all three parts of the Lemon test. Although this country was founded upon
the ethics and mores of the Judeo-Christian religion, the United States was also
founded upon, at least in theory, the ideals of equality and tolerance. Too often
in our nation's past have we ignored and disregarded the cultures of minorities.
By supporting moments of silence in public schools, state legislatures are, in
essence, providing state support, assistance, and influence to the majority faith.
Only by reasserting the respect that all individuals and religious beliefs deserve
can we begin to reassemble the wall Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
erected so long ago. Only then can the rights of the minority be upheld.
2 68 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1, 8.
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